EXPLORING CONTINUOUS EFFORTS OF KREMLIN’S BOTS CAMPAIGNS
The world is well aware of the information campaigns in Russia that have been used to influence public opinions and discussions in a pro-government direction. Several investigations have proven that these campaigns originated from the media empire of the late Wagner Group chief, Evgeniy Prigozhin, and were colloquially known as the “Troll Factory.” However, what has happened since Prigozhin’s death? How has it affected the online campaigns, companies, and initiatives that are reputed to have influenced the American elections in 2016?
Prigozhin’s death has led to significant changes in the structure and operations of online influence campaigns. His passing has created a power vacuum, resulting in shifts within the companies and media outlets he controlled. Without Prigozhin’s direct leadership, these operations have experienced organizational disruptions and a possible decline in their coordinated efforts, even though the campaigns remain active on the internet.
Despite these setbacks, the influence campaigns continue, albeit with potentially reduced effectiveness. The Russian state and associated entities have maintained their strategic goals of manipulating public discourse, but the loss of a key figure like Prigozhin may have diluted their capacity to execute these operations with the same level of impact and cohesion as before.
WNM presents findings on the ongoing campaigns conducted by the same entities responsible for previous Russian online influence operations. These users, often referred to as “bots” or “kremlebots” (Russian slang for Kremlin’s bots), operate within organized companies, offices, or departments consisting of paid human users and sometimes automated bot campaigns.
Nowadays, with improved bot defenses on media platforms, automated campaigns are encountered much less frequently. Instead, individuals work in an organized and consistent manner to disseminate specific agendas. Although these “bots” are human users, they are highly distinguishable by their use of the same messages and manner of speaking. They are prohibited from using certain vocabulary that could discredit the propaganda agendas.
The presence of “kremlebots” became widely noted starting in the 2010s, primarily appearing on Russia’s largest social network, VKontakte, and on LiveJournal, a popular Russian blogging platform. These platforms were significant not only for their widespread use but also because many Russian opposition figures, including Alexei Navalny, began their media careers there.
The “bots” used to build up the networks with cross-commenting and cross-replying, building the pro-government narratives and starting fights with the users of the opposite opinion. They also would utilize the international news events promoting the opinions or agendas that are beneficial for the pro-Russian side.
For example, according to one of the accounts, that claim to have worked for the “Troll Factory”, the task for the day was to write that Trump didn’t great Putin because “at the G20 summit there was bustle, jostling and everything was scheduled to the minute”, “Nevertheless, we write, the summit has just begun, and Putin and Trump will probably discuss world problems on the sidelines, especially since Trump clearly feels lonely at the summit.”
Screenshot from the “Kremlebot Confession” group on VKontakte revealing the propaganda agenda for the G20 summit in 2018. (Source: VK)
The Troll Factories have been reported to reside in Saint Petersburg, primarily in Olgino, a historic neighborhood of the city. This location was associated with the office of the Internet Research Agency, which paid people to post comments and maintain discussions online.
According to Google Trends in the last 12 months, the location’s traffic is still active:
